David Grundmanns

This manuscript contrasts two different explanations for interest groups litigation strategies at the Israeli High Court of Justice. On the one hand, resourceful actors with experience in litigation are expected to push their advantage and settle where decision on the merits may be unfavorable. Repeat player (RP) interest groups are expected to settle more at the Israeli High Court of Justice because settlements are the primary way to facilitate rule-change. On the other hand, interest groups rely on publicity to mobilize
members and resources. Following this logic, interest groups should prioritize overt outcomes, i.e. decision on the merits, in their litigation strategies. Specifically, they should avoid settlements and aim for visible decisions. The manuscript proposes to distinguish between interest groups repeatedly involved in litigation—referred to as RPs—and those who are only involved once or occasionally—referred to as one-shotters (OSs)—to analyze interest groups’ litigation outcomes at the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ). I argue that RP public interest groups that need to mobilize members and resources and repeatedly litigate are more likely to use their RP advantage to push for visible outcomes because they rely on public communication to mobilize resources, and litigation constitutes a part of their engagements to communicate on. The findings suggest that RP interest groups at the HCJ, in contrast to other resourceful RPs and OS interest groups, settle less and have more of their claims decided on the merits. The presented results have implications for our understanding of how interest groups use their resources and litigation expertise to different ends based on their organizational needs.